

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07
NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 NSC-05
CU-02 IO-13 DODE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00
INRE-00 EURE-00 /073 W
-----071350Z 101393 /40

O 071241Z APR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2720

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 2019

FOR EUR/RPM

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: NATO, CSCE, PARM
SUBJECT: CSCE/CBMS: REVISED VERSION OF CBMS PORTION
OF REPORT TO MINISTERS

REF: (A) USNATO 1996, (B) STATE 075283 (C) USNATO 1875

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS REWORKED TEXT OF CBMS SHORT
PAPER (ISD/145 REVISED) WHICH IS INENDED FOR IN-
SERTION INTO OVERALL REPORT TO MINISTERS ON
BELGRADE PREPARATIONS (ISD/146). WE BELIEVE THIS
REVISION IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER
ORIGINAL VERSION AND RECOMMEND THAT WE SUPPORT IT
AT APRIL 13 POLADS MEETING. ACTION REQUEST: GUI-
DANCE IN TIME FOR APRIL 13 POLADS. END SUMMARY.

1. AS DEPARTMENT WILL NOTE, TITLE OF ISD/145 (REVISED)
NOW RFLCTS LANGUAGE OF TITLE OF CBMS DOCUMENT IN
FINAL ACT. IN ADDITION, THE ORDER OF THE PAPER HAS
BEEN REWORKED TO PUT FOCUS ON CBMS, WITH DIS-
ARMAMENT ISSUES RECEIVING LESS PROMENENCE.
AS WE REPORTED IN REF A, WE BELIEVE DEPART-
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MENT'S SUGGESTIONS HAVE BEEN FULLY REFLECTED
IN REVISED VERSION.

2. WE ALSO FLAG FOR DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION THAT
REVISED VERSION CONTAINNS PHRASE "ALLIES CON-
CERNED" WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBILITY OF ALLIES
ADVANCING NEW CBM PROPOSALS (AS WELL AS IN REFERENCE
TO MBFR). THIS LANGUAGE WAS USED AT INSITENCE OF
FRENCH DELEGATION, WHICH REITERATED ITS RESERVA-
TIONS ABOUT NEW CBM INITIATIVES.

3. FINALLY, REVISED VERSION ALSO INCLUDES AS AN ANNEX, A DRAFT INDICATIVE LIST OF POSSIBLE ALLIED CBM PROPOSALS WHICH DOES NOT REFLECT ANY CONSENSUS INPOLADS, EITHER AS TO SUBSTANCE OR PRIORITIES. THE PROPOSALS ARE LISTED IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEIR SUBJECT MATTER APPEARS IN THE FINAL ACT.

4. COMMENT: AS WE NOTED IN REF A, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF DEPARTMENT COULD GIVE US FURTHER GUIDANCE REGARDING POSSIBLE ORDER OF PRIORITIES AMONG THESE PROPOSALS WHICH WASHINGTON PREFERS.
END COMMENT.

5. RECOMMENDATION: WE BELIEVE NARRATIVE PORTION OF REVISED PAPER TO BE AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE ORIGINAL VERSION AND RECOMMEND WE BE AUTHORIZED TO AGREE TO IT AT APRIL 13 POLADS MEETING. ACTION REQUEST.
GUIDANCE IN TIME FOR APRIL 13 POLADS.

6. BEGIN TEXT OF ISD/145 (REVISED):

ANNEX I TO ISD/145 (REVISED)
THE FOLLOWING TEXT SHOULD BE INSERTED AT THE BOTTOM OF PAGE 5 OF ISD/146:

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CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

THE ALLIES SHOULD INSIST ON A FULL REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFIDENCEBUILDING MEASURES. ALLIES SHOULD ALSO PRESS FOR A MORE EXTENSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING CBM PROVISIONS IN THE FUTURE. IF CONSISTENT WITH THEIR OVERALL GOALS AND THE TACTICAL SITUATION AT THE BELGRADE MEETINGS, ALLIES MIGHT WISH TO ADVANCE OR SUPPORT A LIMITED NUMBER OF PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO BRING A LARGER PART OF THE WARSAW PACT MILITARY ACTIVITY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NOTIFICATIONS AND OBSERVATION BY BUILDING UPON THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION I OF THE FINAL ACT.

THE BELGRADE MEETINGS WILL NOT BE A SUITABLE OCCASION FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION OF DISARMAMENT ISSUES. IF THE EAST WERE TO TRY TO FOCUS ON DISARMAMENT, THE ALLIES MIGHT RESIST SUCH PRESSURE STRESSING, HOWEVER, THEIR GENERAL COMMITMENT TO DISARMAMENT. IF THE WP COUNTRIES ADVANCE OLD PROPOSALS ALREADY REJECTED (E.G. NON FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS) THE ALLIES MIGHT BRIEFLY RESTATE THE REASONS FOR THEIR REJECTION.

THE FOLLOWING TEXT SHOULD BE INSERTED AFTER PARAGRAPH 50 OF ISD/146:

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY
AND DISARMAMENT

A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF
CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES SHOULD BE THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF
ALLIED EFFORTS AT BELGRADE IN THIS AREA. THE LIBERAL PRACTICE
OF ALLIED COUNTRIES CONCERNED IN THE NOTIFICATION OF SMALLER
SCALE MANOEUVRES AND THE INVITATION AND TREATMENT OF OBSERVERS
SHOULD BE CONTRASTED WITH THE EASTERN IMPLEMENTATION IN THESE
FIELDS.

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07
NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 NSC-05
CU-02 IO-13 DODE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 2019

FOR EUR/RPM

IT WOULD BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE ALLIES IF A
LARGER PART OF THE RELEVANT WP ACTIVITIES COULD BE BROUGHT
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION. TO THIS
END, THE ALLIES WHO SO WISH COULD PRESS FOR A MORE EXTENSIVE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DISCRETIONARY CBM PROVISIONS ON THE
NOTIFICATION OF SMALLER MANOEUVRES AND THE INVITATION OF
OBSERVERS. THESE ALLIES COULD ALSO ADVANCE OR SUPPORT A
LIMITED NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS (SEE ANNEX A), EXTENDING
EXISTING PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT IN THE LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE
SINCE HELSINKI. (THIS IS PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION I OF THE
FINAL ACT).

WHETHER ALLIES WILL WISH TO GO BEYOND A REVIEW OF
IMPLEMENTATION AND PRESS FOR IMPROVEMENTS, BE IT BY INSISTING
ON MORE EXTENSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING PROVISIONS OR BY
MAKING NEW PROPOSALS, WILL ALSO DEPEND ON THE TACTICAL SITUATION
AT BELGRADE. MOREOVER, ANY INITIATIVE THEY ENVISAGE IN THIS
FIELD MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL GOALS OF THE ALLIES.
ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THIS CONTEXT WILL BE THE ATTITUDE
OF THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. IF, AS NOW SEEMS
LIKELY, THESE COUNTRIES TAKE A STRONG STAND ON THE EXPANSION
OF CBMS, ALLIES WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO PUT FORWARD
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PROPOSALS AND OBTAIN EASTERN CONCESSIONS IN THIS FIELD. IN THE EVENT THAT THE WP STATES PUSH HARD FOR DISCUSSION OF SECURITY ISSUES, WESTERN COUNTRIES MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER IT TACTICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO ADVANCE PROPOSALS ON CBMS SO AS TO PREVENT WP COUNTRIES POSING AS PACESETTERS IN THE SECURITY FIELD. THE ALLIES WILL IN ANY CASE ONLY BE ABLE TO DETERMINE THEIR COURSE OF ACTION AT BELGRADE NEARER THE TIME OF THE MEETINGS AND WHEN THE ATTITUDE OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IS KNOWN IN GREATER DETAIL.

THE BELGRADE MEETINGS WILL NOT BE A SUITABLE OCCASION FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION OF DISARMAMENT ISSUES, WHICH ARE MORE PROPERLY THE CONCERN OF OTHER FORA. THUS, ALTHOUGH THE ALLIES MAY WISH TO RE-EMPHASISE THEIR STRONG COMMITMENT TO DISARMAMENT AND THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO PROGRESS IN THIS FIELD, THEY WILL WISH TO RESIST SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ATTEMPTS TO DIVERT DISCUSSION FROM SUBJECTS IN WHICH THE ALLIES HAVE A MAJOR INTEREST. IN RESISTING SUCH MOVES, THE ALLIES CONCERNED MIGHT POINT TO INITIATIVES THEY HAVE TAKEN IN THIS FIELD, E.G., IN MBFR AND SALT, SPELL OUT THEIR APPROACH TO LESSENING THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND STATE FORMALLY THAT REAL PROGRESS CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES AND IN THE APPROPRIATE FORA.

THERE ARE TO DATE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE WP STATES WILL MAKE SPECIFIC NEW PROPOSALS ON DISARMAMENT AT BELGRADE. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL REPEAT OLD PROPOSALS, E.G. FOR A TREATY ON THE NON FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THAT CASE THE ALLIES SHOULD RESPOND BY RESTATING THEIR REASONS FOR REJECTING THESE PROPOSALS.

THE FOLLOWING TEXT SHOULD BE INSERTED AT ANNEX A, PAGE 2, OF ISD/146

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT
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BASIS: THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION I OF THE FINAL ACT STATES THAT THE EXPERIENCE GAINED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CBM PROVISIONS TOGETHER WITH FURTHER EFFORTS COULD LEAD TO DEVELOPING AND ENLARGING MEASURES AIMED AT STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE.

PROPOSAL:

(1) NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES:
THE PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD DECLARE THEIR INTENTION TO LOWER THE CURRENT 25,000 MAN THRESHOLD FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES TO 10,000 MEN OR SOME HIGHER FIGURE.

(2) PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF OTHER MILITARY MANOEUVRES:
THE PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD DECLARE THEIR INTENTION TO
STRENGTHEN IMPLEMENTATION OF NOTIFICATION OF SMALLER SCALE
MANOEUVRES.

(3) TIME FRAME FOR NOTIFICATION:
BASIS: THE SUB-PARAGRAPH ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY
MANOEUVRES PROVIDES THAT NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN 21 DAYS "OR
MORE" IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF THE MANOEUVRES.

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07
NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 NSC-05
CU-02 IO-13 DODE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00
INRE-00 /073 W

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 USNATO 2019
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FOR CLASSIFICATION)
FOR EUR/RPM

PROPOSAL:
THE PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD DECLARE THEIR INTENTION TO EXTEND
THE 21 DAY MINIMUM TIMEFRAME FOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY
MANOEUVRES.

(4) CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION:
BASIS: THE SUB-PARAGRAPH ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY
MANOEUVRES PROVIDES THAT STATES BEYOND THE MINIMUM INFORMATION
STIPULATED, WILL ALSO PROVIDE, IF POSSIBLE, ADDITIONAL RELEVANT
INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY THAT RELATED TO THE COMPONENTS OF THE
FORCES ENGAGED AND THE PERIOD OF INVOLVEMENT OF THESE FORCES.

PROPOSAL:
THE PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD DECLARE THEIR INTENTION TO BROADEN
THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES TO
INCLUDE THE CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION MENTIONED ABOVE AS WELL AS OTHER

SUITABLE CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION.

(5) NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS:
THE PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO
IMPLEMENT THE DISCRETIONARY PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT ON PRIOR
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NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS.

(6) EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS:

(A) INVITATION OF OBSERVERS:

BASIS: THE SUB-CHAPTER ON EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS PROVIDES THAT PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, VOLUNTARILY AND ON A BILATERAL BASIS, TO SEND OBSERVERS TO ATTEND MILITARY MANOEUVRES.

PROPOSAL:

THE PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD DECLARE THEIR INTENTION TO INVITE OBSERVERS MORE FREQUENTLY AND TO SHOW GREATER RESPONSIVENESS TO INVITATIONS BY OTHER STATES.

(B) TREATMENT OF OBSERVERS:

THE PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD AGREE ON A LIMITED NUMBER OF STANDARD CRITERIA TO BE APPLIED TO THE TREATMENT OF OBSERVERS, SUCH AS GRANTING BETTER OPPORTUNITIES TO OBSERVE THE OVERALL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANOEUVRE, PROVIDING ADEQUATE BRIEFINGS ON THE MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE MANOEUVRE AND AUTHORISING THE USE OF BINOCULARS AND CAMERAS. END TEXT. STRAUZ-HUPE

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

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